employment contracts requiring employees to charge only those prices specified by their employer are lawful, notwithstanding their restraint of employees' freedom. That result is usually phrased in terms not of the reasonableness of the restraint but of the absence of any cognizable conspiracy. 3 In sum, given that resale price maintenance is assessed under §1 of the Sherman Act, the legal issue can be phrased as one of the agent's capacity to conspire with its principal over prices to consumers. In all events, the existence of a cognizable conspiracy between principal and agent or its reasonableness depends upon policy judgments about whether and in what circumstances agents should be regarded as part of a principal's enterprise and thus as subject to internal direction about downstream pricing without regard to the Dr. Miles rule.
The employee is regarded as "inside the firm,"
and thus the manager's and employee's "agreement" that the latter will charge a certain price is regarded as a unilateral act.
The law on this question seemed settled in 1926 when the Supreme Court held in
General Electric that a manufacturer could lawfully fix the prices charged by its "agents."
4 That doctrine, however, was severely limited in 1964 by Simpson, arrangements with a "vast" number of intermediaries whom the Court deemed to be "independent businessmen."
RPM and the First Sale Doctrine
When patented or copyrighted articles were made the subject of resale price maintenance agreements, manufacturers sometimes labeled the product with notices that stated that the dealers who bought them were "licensed" to resell only at specified prices. The manufacturers sued those who sold for less as infringers. Rather than obtaining or enforcing any contractual promise by dealers, as in Dr. Miles, manufacturers claimed that such notices defined the extent of the license they granted purchasers to use their patents or copyrights and that reselling for a lower price departed from that license and thus infringed the patent or copyright.
5.1
Such claims have been read very narrowly by the Supreme Court. In its 1908
Bobbs-Merrill decision, the Court held that a retailer who had sold a book for less than the specified price did not infringe the publisher's copyright, notwithstanding the publisher's notice declaring such a sale to be an infringement. statute precluded others from publishing the book, it did not limit subsequent disposition of books published and sold by the copyright holder. To add to the publisher's "right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute."
7
The Court did not then rule upon the enforceability of a contractual promise to charge a specified price, although it later did so in Dr. Miles. To be sure, patented or copyrighted articles might be distinguished from ordinary goods, but the Supreme Court has ruled since 1873 that patented articles pass outside the statutory monopoly once sold, and there are no grounds for giving greater power to copyright holders. In Adams, before the Sherman Act was passed, the plaintiff had rights under a patent to manufacture certain coffin lids within ten miles of Boston. The principles of these early patent cases and of Bobbs-Merrill were followed when the Court dealt with alleged patent infringement by dealers reselling patented products at discounted prices. In Bauer a patentee-manufacturer "licensed" dealers to resell only unlicensed use and thus an infringement. The Court disagreed, holding that "it is a perversion of terms to call the transaction in any sense a license to use the invention," 13 and quoting from Adams the proposition that selling the goods removes them from the patent monopoly.
14 The Supreme Court found it equally easy to rebuff the more complicated scheme in the Straus case.
15
that only the right to use the machine "for demonstrating purposes" is granted to "distributors" (wholesale dealers), but that these "distributors" may assign a like right "to the public" or to "regularly licensed Victor dealers" (retailers) "at the dealers' regular discount royalty"; that the "dealers" may convey the "license to use the machine" only when a "royalty" of not less than $200 shall have been paid, and upon the "consideration" that all of the conditions of the "license" shall have been observed; that the title to the machine shall remain in the plaintiff which shall have the right to repossess it
The Court described the "license notice" attached to each patented machine as declaring upon breach of any of the conditions of the notice, by paying to the user the amount paid by him less five per cent for each year that the machine has been used.
16
The Court noted that "the full price, called a 'royalty,' was paid before the
[manufacturer] parted with the possession of it," 17 and concluded that this "scheme of distribution is not a system designed to secure to the plaintiff and to the public a reasonable use of its machines, within the grant of the patent laws, but is in substance and in fact a mere price-fixing enterprise." 18 Once again, the patent laws did not make price cutting an infringement. In the Ethyl 19 and Univis
20
The Ethyl Company held a patent on an "anti-knock" fluid that the company made and sold to gasoline refiners, who incorporated it in their gas. The resulting mixture was also subject to Ethyl's patent. The refiners were restricted from selling to jobbers other than those licensed by Ethyl, and jobbers were restricted from selling to gasoline stations other than those approved by Ethyl. Although such customer restrictions might cases, patentees had issued licenses to wholesalers and retailers, setting the price at which each could sell to the next party in the chain. In both instances, the Supreme Court held that patent law did not protect the manufacturers and applied Dr. Miles to condemn the arrangement. where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article.
The reward he has demanded and received is for the article and the invention which it embodies and which his vendee is to practice upon it. He has thus parted with his right to assert the patent monopoly with respect to it and is no longer free to control the price at which it may be sold either in its unfinished or finished form. No one would doubt that if the patentee's licensee had sold the blanks to a wholesaler or finishing retailer, without more, the purchaser would not infringe by grinding and selling them. The added stipulation by the patentee fixing resale prices derives no support from the patent and must stand on the same footing under the Sherman Act as like stipulations with respect to unpatented commodities.
23
With the patent put aside, the arrangement violated Dr. Miles' prohibition of resale price maintenance.
24
The first sale, or patent "exhaustion," doctrine operates only as a limitation on the rights created under the relevant intellectual property statutes; it does not independently create or modify antitrust liability. This distinction between removal of the intellectual property immunity and the creation of antitrust liability is particularly important in rule of reason cases. To illustrate, suppose that patentee General Electric licensed Westinghouse to manufacture light bulbs under GE's patent. The license agreement stipulated that (1) Westinghouse could not charge a wholesale price higher than $1.00 each for the finished bulbs; and (2) resellers who purchased from Westinghouse could not sell the bulbs to consumers for a price higher than $1.50. As interpreted in the 23 Univis, 316 U.S. at 250-251. Note that this language implies that Ethyl had exhausted its patent rights when it sold its patented fluid to the refiners; because such fluid had no use except to be combined with gasoline, the refiner would have an implied license to make the patented combination, just as those who purchase blanks from Univis do not infringe its patent over the finished product by grinding and finishing the blanks. 24 The Univis Court relied on United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) and Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940 There is no reason to think that Quanta upset the status quo on the contract issue.
Thus, a patent infringement action to enforce a resale price maintenance restriction 4 17 U.S.C. §109; and see H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 , at 79 (1976 , reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Maryland L. Rev. 616, 663 & nn. 220-221 (2008) ("although Congress intended to allow parties to contract around the first-sale doctrine, it would require that such waivers be enforced through breach of contract actions, not through copyright infringement actions.").
